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Abstract:  
Intellectual attention, like perceptual attention, is a special mode of mental engagement 
with the world. When we attend intellectually, rather than making use of sensory 
information we make use of the kind of information that shows up in occurent thought, 
memory, and the imagination (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). In this paper, I argue 
that reflecting on what it is like to comprehend memory demonstratives speaks in favour of 
the view that intellectual attention is required to understand memory demonstratives. 
Moreover, I argue that this is a line of thought endorsed by Gareth Evans in his Varieties of 
Reference (1982). In so doing, I improve on interpretations of Evans that have been offered 
by Christopher Peacocke (1984), and Christoph Hoerl & Theresa McCormack (a coauthored 
piece, 2005).  In so doing I also improve on McDowell’s (1990) criticism of Peacocke’s 
interpretation of Evans. Like McDowell, I believe that Peacocke might overemphasize the 
role that “memory-images” play in Evans’ account of comprehending memory 
demonstratives. But unlike McDowell, I provide a positive characterization of how Evans 






















In Principles of Psychology, William James distinguished between perceptual 
attention and intellectual attention – the attention we pay in careful thought or imagination 
as opposed to careful seeing or listening (James 1890 p. 416). Psychologists today continue 
to study intellectual attention under the heading of “internal attention” or “reflective 
attention”, explicitly asserting that these new terms refer to the same phenomenon that 
William James called “intellectual attention” (Backer & Alain, 2014, p. 439; Chun, Golomb, & 
Turk-Browne, 2011, p. 77). When contemporary psychologists talk about internal rather 
external attention, in their view they are talking about attention that requires using 
information from mental representations that are stimulus independent rather than 
stimulus-dependent; i.e., representations that do not depend for their existence on active 
causal contact with a stimulus.1 For example, a visual experience of the sunset requires an 
active causal contact with the sunset; a memory, by contrast, does not. On this way of 
thinking, once the sunset is over, only internal or intellectual attention towards the sunset 
is possible.  
  But note that acknowledging the phenomenon of intellectual attention does not 
necessitate drawing the demarcation between perceptual and intellectual attention in this 
precise manner. The way contemporary psychologists draw this demarcation may be 
controversial, and worth further investigation. But what is less controversial is the claim 
that there is an intellectual kind of attention. Aristotle, for instance, notes in On the Sense 
and the Sensible that a perceptual or an intellectual kind of focus can both cause us to fail to 
 
1 For more on the boundary between the perceptual and the cognitive see Burge 2010, p. 378; Beck 2012, p. 
586; and Beck 2017. For this understanding of the boundary as it shows up in psychology and in the 




notice what is going on around us when he writes: “… persons do not perceive what is 
brought before their eyes, if they are in deep thought, or in a fright, or listening to some 
loud noise”. (Sens. 447a14-16, emphasis mine) 
The distinction between these two kinds of attention puts us in a position to ask 
whether intellectual attention is ever necessary to understand certain kinds of speech. The 
perceptual analogue of this question has been extensively discussed in the recent 
literature, particularly with respect to the question of whether perceptual attention is ever 
required to understand perceptual demonstratives.2 The intellectual version of this 
question is, however, relatively under-explored, especially when we think of intellectual 
attention that manifests in occurrent thought rather than in memory.3  
Moreover, there are a variety of ways that my broad question about intellectual 
attention and linguistic understanding could be made more precise. We could ask, for 
instance, whether linguistic understanding ever requires joint rather than solitary 
intellectual attention, or whether intellectual attention to propositions plays a role in the 
best account of linguistic understanding.4 In this paper, I restrict the scope of my discussion 
to the relatively simple and narrow question of whether intellectual attention is required to 
understand uses of “memory demonstratives”. Memory demonstrates are demonstratives 
that refer to an object that two interlocutors can remember previously perceiving, but 
which the interlocutors cannot at present perceive.  
 
2 See e.g. Siegel 2002, Dickie 2011, and Smithies 2011. 
3 As my engagement with Hoerl and McCormack below demonstrates, there are some theorists who have 
considered the role attention and memory play together in speech comprehension.  
4 See Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack & Roessler (eds. 2005) for some discussions of the phenomenon of joint 





 I argue that Gareth Evans, in The Varieties of References, has already argued for a 
“yes” answer to my simpler and narrow question about intellectual attention and memory 
demonstratives. But most readers of Evans don’t seem to have noticed this fact and have 
misrepresented his account of what it takes to understand a memory demonstrative. In so 
doing I improve on interpretations of Evans that have been offered by Christopher 
Peacocke, John McDowell, Christoph Hoerl, and Teresa McCormack. 
 I attribute to Evans a view of attention very much like William James’s view, 
according to which attention phenomenologically singles out an object from all the others 
like a spotlight can single out one object from all the other objects around it (James 1890 
pp. 403-404; this is my gloss on James’s claim that attention “focalizes” consciousness). I 
also attribute to Evans an awareness that there are at least two kinds of attention – 
perceptual and intellectual attention, although I do not attribute to him any particular 
detailed manner of analyzing this distinction (e.g. in terms of stimulus independence and 
dependence).  
 The metaphor of spotlighting something in consciousness applies just as well to the 
cognitive part of the stream of consciousness as it does for the perceptual part of the 
stream of consciousness. When one is conscious of several objects on top of a cluttered 
table, one can focus on one’s keys, thereby making them phenomenologically singled out 
from the mess of objects on the table. When one is conscious of several possible ways of 
responding to an argument, one can focus on the most promising method of reply, thereby 
making it phenomenologically singled out from the other possible pathways in thought that 




 On my reading of Evans, this spotlighting function of attention is required to 
comprehend both perceptual demonstratives and memory demonstratives. One does not 
comprehend a perceptual demonstrative referring to one particular person in a crowded 
room until the right person is singled out in experience. Similarly, one does not 
comprehend a memory demonstrative referring to a past event until that past event is 
singled out in experience.  
 As I show below, while Evans is relatively explicit about the link that exists between 
perceptual demonstratives and perceptual attention, it takes more work to establish the 
claim about memory demonstratives and intellectual attention. I do not attribute this latter 
view to Evans on the basis of explicit claims he makes about the nature or phenomenology 
of intellectual attention. I also do not attribute either of this view to Evans on the basis of 
his deference to some particular psychologist’s account of intellectual attention. While he 
does occasionally refer to psychology in Varieties of Reference, none of his references in 
that direction appear to elucidate his account of attention.  
 Instead, I attribute this view to Evans through a project of rational reconstruction. 
According to Evans, memory demonstratives are “information-invoking Russellian singular 
terms”. I argue that it is a consequence of this claim that intellectual attention is required to 
understand a use of a memory demonstrative. It’s also a consequence of this claim that 
perceptual attention is required to understand a use of a perceptual demonstrative, which 
adds to the relatively straightforward evidence for thinking that Evans endorses such a 
view.  
 This paper, therefore, has goals that pertain to both the history of analytic 




interpretations of Evans, the paper makes progress in the history of philosophy. And 
through bringing Evans’s view to light, the paper opens up a range of interesting questions 
about intellectual attention and speech comprehension that analytic philosophers should 
be interested in investigating. 5  
 Before setting out to accomplish the two goals main goals of the paper I just 
described, I’ll explain what I mean by “linguistic understanding” and the more 
straightforward evidence that Evans saw a connection between perceptual attention and 
understanding a perceptual demonstrative.  
1. Linguistic Understanding and Perceptual Attention  
 By “linguistic understanding”, I mean the mental state that a person occupies when 
they comprehend some speech. There are several competing views about how to provide 
an analysis of linguistic understanding. According to some, it is knowing what was said by 
the speaker’s production of the speech in question.6 According to some others, it is having a 
perceptual or quasi-perceptual experience of the speaker’s meaning.7 According to yet 
others, it is having a cognitive experience of the speaker’s meaning.8  
 Whichever of these views is the right one, the question of whether perceptual 
 
5 For more on the nature of intellectual or internal attention, see Fortney 2019, Fortney 2020a, Fortney 
2020b. 
 
6 See Peacocke (1976) for a version of the knowledge thesis and criticism of simpler views according to which 
understanding is just knowing what was said. See Recanati (2004 pp. 5-9) for an explication of the notion of 
“what was said”, and how it differs from “sentence meaning” and “what is implicated”. 
 
7 See Hunter (1998) and Fricker (2003) for versions of the meaning perception thesis. On this approach we 
might characterize the content of the audience’s experience (in part) what was said by the utterance. 
 
8 See Longworth (2005) for this view of linguistic understanding. See Smithies (2011) for more on the 




attention is ever required to comprehend speech, and the question of whether intellectual 
attention is ever required to comprehend some speech, are both left unanswered. Further 
work is required to settle those questions. 
 When it comes to the unanswered question about perceptual attention and speech 
comprehension, it’s common for philosophers to believe that intuitions about the 
phenomenology of conscious attention can help address the question – for instance, this is 
a view that’s shared by both John Campbell (2003) and Gareth Evans (1982). Campbell and 
Evans both think that perceptual attention plays a role in the having a perceptual 
demonstrative thought, and consequently also in coming to understand a use of a 
perceptual demonstrative.   
 Here is how Campbell put this view about perceptual attention and linguistic 
understanding, along with what he took to be the intuitive motivations for the view.  
… consider an ordinary case in which you and I are sitting at a dinner 
table with a large number of people around and you make a remark 
to me about ‘that woman’. There are a lot of people around; I can't 
yet visually single out which one you mean. So on anyone's account, I 
do not yet know which woman you are talking about. Suppose now 
that we add to the example. My visual experience remains as before: 
a sea of faces. I cannot consciously single out the person you mean. 
All I get consciously is the sea of faces. … It is only when I have finally 
managed to single out the woman in my experience of the room, 
when it ceases to be a sea of faces and in my experience I focus on 
that person, that I would ordinarily be said to know who was being 
referred to. So it does seem to be compelling to common sense that 
conscious attention to the object is needed for an understanding of 
the demonstrative (Campbell 2003 pp. 8-9). 
As we can see, Campbell thinks that reflecting on what it is like to comprehend a perceptual 




the demonstrative. There is a difference between failing to attend to the referent and 
successfully attending to the referent, and what seems to make the difference is 
phenomenologically singling out the referent from all the other objects.  
 Here is how Evans puts the same sort of view:  
 … in order to have a demonstrative thought (one that rests upon 
perceptual information), the subject must be able to make the object 
out in what he perceives; and there is necessarily a gap between 
grasping 'The blonde who looks thus and so is F ' and 'That blonde is 
F’, because there is always room for an intelligible realization: ‘Ah! So 
that’s the blonde you mean! (Evans 1982 pp. 308-309).  
Evans’s claim that an audience’s understanding a perceptual demonstrative requires “make 
the object out” seems to be a claim about consciously attending to the object in question. 
While he does not use the term “attention” in this passage, he is clearly referring to the 
exact same phenomenon of consciousness that Campbell referred to in the passage before, 
a phenomenon of consciousness that Campbell, and many other philosophers, such as 
James (1890) and Watzl (2018) think of as an effect of attention. So it’s reasonable to think 
that Evans thought he was describing a subject perceptually attending when he was 
describing a subject that had “made the object out” in perception. And this becomes even 
more reasonable to believe when we consider this remark from the end of Chapter 6, which 
does explicitly link attention to perceptual demonstratives: “[the] fundamental basis, then, 
of a demonstrative Idea of a perceptible thing is a capacity to attend selectively to a single 
thing over a period of time… ” (Evans 1982 p. 175, emphasis mine). 
 So Campbell and Evans both seem to endorse the idea that perceptual attention is 




seem to endorse William James’s idea that attention involves “… the taking possession by 
the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible 
objects or trains of thought... Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its 
essence” (1890 pp. 403-404).  Making out the right person in perception and singling out 
the right face in the sea of faces both seem like specific instances of the mind’s taking 
possession, in clear and vivid form, of an object of thought.  
 Note that in joining James in endorsing this view about the phenomenology of 
attention, Campbell and Evans are not endorsing a mere platitude that any ordinary 
speaker competent with the word “attention” would endorse. Wayne Wu, for instance, 
argues that attention has no distinctive, systematic impact on phenomenology, and that the 
claim that it does seem to phenomenologically single out one object from all the rest may 
be a product of reflection on special cases (Wu 2014 p. 130). The task of settling the 
dispute between Watzl, Campbell, and Evans, on the one hand, and Wu, on the other hand, 
is outside of the scope of this paper. But the existence of the dispute is important. It flags 
that Evans, in saying that we understand a perceptual demonstrative only when we have 
made out the referent in perception, is committing himself to a substantive thesis about the 
phenomenological function of attention.  
2. A Question About Memory Demonstratives  
 So Evans’s phenomenological claims about what it is like to understand perceptual 
demonstratives reveals his belief that perceptual attention is required to understand 
perceptual demonstratives, as does his explicit claim about the connection between 




holds for memory demonstratives and intellectual attention?  
 Here is how he describes what it is like to comprehend a memory demonstrative: 
… consider the following case. S and A were in the habit of going hunting 
together in their youth. On one of their hunting trips, they saw a dazzlingly 
beautiful bird perched in a pine tree. Years later, S (the speaker) may advert 
to this incident, and say something like: ‘Do you remember that bird we saw 
years ago? I wonder whether it was shot.’ A (the audience) may not 
remember this episode. In order to jog his memory, S may say ‘Surely you 
remember; a hunting trip years ago; we saw, on a pine tree, a magnificent 
bird’…  I do not think he can be said to have understood the remark, as it was 
intended to be understood, until he remembers the bird – until the right 
information is retrieved. (Evans 1982 p. 308).  
His description of what it is like to comprehend this memory demonstration seems 
structurally similar to his description of what it is like to single out the right person in 
perception. At first, the audience is conscious of a range of different possible persons that 
the speaker might have in mind (in the perceptual case) or a range of different possible 
birds seen on hunting trips that the speaker might have in mind (in the case of memory). 
Then, the audience’s conscious state changes in a way that enables understanding, and the 
change is one which involves becoming conscious of the right person or bird. 
 That being said, it’s less obvious, in this case, whether Evans would have wanted to 
characterize this change in consciousness as one involving attention. In the perceptual case, 
he uses the language of making an object out, which seems to be what James had in mind 
with attention’s focalizing an object in consciousness, or what Campbell had in mind with 
attention singling an object out in consciousness. But here, Evans just says that the 
audience needs to remember the bird and to retrieve the right information. These claims 




by “retrieve the right information”.  
 In the next section of this paper, I argue that his understanding of “retrieving the right 
information” is an understanding that implicates intellectual attention. According to my 
argument, Evans thinks that perceptual  demonstratives and memory demonstratives are 
singular terms that are “information-invoking” and “Russellian”, and his definitions of 
“information-invoking term” and “Russellian” singular term commits him to the idea that 
attention is required to understand these terms – perceptual attention for perceptual 
demonstratives, intellectual attention for memory demonstratives.   
3. Attention & Information-Invoking Russellian Singular Terms 
Evans describes the notion of an information-invoking Russellian singular term over 
the course of his attempt to make more rigorous the rough idea that there is a way of being 
particularly ‘directly’ or ‘intimately’ related to an object of thought : 
Many philosophers today look at the theory of reference through 
essentially Russellian eyes. … Like Russell, they recognize the 
possibility, perhaps as a limiting case, of thinking of an object by 
description ... But, again like Russell, they cherish the idea of a more 
'intimate', more 'direct' relation in which a subject may stand to an 
object (a situation in which the subject would be 'en rapport with' the 
object), and the idea that when a subject and his audience are both 
situated vis-a-vis an object in this way, there exists the possibility of 
using singular terms to refer to, and to talk about, that object in a 
quite different way, expressing thoughts which would not have been 
available to be thought and expressed if the object had not existed. 
(Evans 1982 p. 64) 
 
Evans wanted to give an account of what it is to be in a “more intimate” or “more direct” or 
“en rapport” relationship with an object of thought. On his view, when we are thinking of an 




according to which “a subject cannot make a judgment about something unless he knows 
which object his judgment is about” (Evans 1982 p. 89). Of course, maintaining such a 
commitment requires explaining what it is to have such “knowledge which”.  
 Evans’s way of explaining what it is for a subject to know which object their 
judgment is about is to say that the subject must have “discriminating knowledge” of such 
an object – i.e., a capacity to pick out the object of that judgment from all other things. He 
thought, for example, that if we can perceive an object, or if we have mastered the use of a 
proper name of an object, then we have discriminating knowledge of the object (Evans 
1982 p. 91, p. 403).9 He calls the kind of thoughts we have when we are in such a position 
“Russellian”, and he calls the terms such that an audience needs to think a Russellian 
thought in order to understand it a “Russellian singular term” (Evans 1982 p. 91).  
 Throughout The Varieties of Reference, one of Evans’s primary goals was to argue 
that various different kinds of “information-invoking” singular terms are also “Russellian” 
singular terms. According to Evans, “information-invoking” singular terms are terms such 
that, when a speaker uses them in an utterance, the audience needs to use some 
information available to her in order to understand the utterance (Evans 1982 pp. 305-
306). “Russellian” singular terms are terms that belong to a category of singular terms such 
that nothing is said by someone who utters a sentence containing such a term unless the 
term has a referent (Evans 1982 p. 71).  
 
9 Here Evans refers to perception rather than attentive perception. I think that it’s best to interpret Evans as 
speaking loosely here – after all, as I’ve already pointed out, he’s argued that it’s attentive perceptual experience 





 For example, if perceptual demonstratives are Russellian singular terms, then a 
speaker who hallucinates and seems to see a dagger and utters “That’s sharp”, intending to 
refer to the dagger that doesn’t exist, has actually said nothing at all. This view is, as Evans 
frequently acknowledges, a startling one. It certainly seems like there is something it is like 
to understand an utterance like “That’s sharp”, said of a hallucinatory dagger. Nevertheless, 
Evans thought that maintaining the view that some singular terms are Russellian was 
important enough that this startling aspect of his view was something to be explained 
away, rather than a sign of a genuine problem (Evans 1982 p. 129-132). Arguments for this 
kind of view appear in various parts of Varieties of Reference. In Chapter 6, for example, 
Evans argues that “here” and perceptual demonstratives are Russellian (Evans 1982 p. 170, 
p. 173). In Chapter 9, Evans takes a different approach, and offers a general argument that 
any information-invoking term is Russellian, including memory demonstratives (Evans 
1982 p. 326).  
 In this paper, I will remain neutral on the question of whether it would actually be a 
good idea to cash out Russell’s intuitive picture of the distinction between two ways of 
thinking about an object in the way that Evans wants to. I will also remain neutral on 
whether Evans’s arguments that information-invoking singular terms are Russellian 
singular terms are actually successful. Instead, I will emphasize that if he believes 
perceptual and memory demonstratives are information-invoking Russellian singular 
terms, then he believes attention is required to understand these terms – perceptual 
attention for perceptual demonstratives, intellectual attention for memory demonstratives. 
This belief is one that is actually overdetermined for Evans. It follows both from the idea 




demonstratives are information-invoking singular terms. Below, I make these points in 
turn.  
 As I explained above, on Evans’s view, Russellian thoughts are supposed to be 
“intimate”, “direct”, or “en raport” ways of being related to an object. But consider William 
James’s apt characterization of the phenomenology of inattentive engagement with an 
object, which appears in the second half of the passage below: 
“Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the 
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, 
concentration, of consciousness, are of its essence. It implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, 
and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, 
scatterbrained state which in French is called distraction, and 
Zerstreutheit in German.” (James 1890 pp. 403-404, emphasis mine) 
A mode of engagement with an object which is confused, dazed, and scatterbrained seems 
to be the opposite of whatever an “intimate”, “direct”, or “en raport” mode of engagement 
with an object would be. This is a reason to think that when a thinker understands a 
Russellian singular term, she must be in a relationship with the referent of the term that is 
attentive rather than inattentive.  
Consequently, the flash of recollection in described in Evans’s hunting trip passage 
must be a thought that involves intellectual attention to an object, and not just any 
cognitive mode of engagement with an object (like inattentive, distracted thought). 
Similarly, making out the person blond in perception, in Evan’s passage about realizing 
which blond person the speaker referred to, must describe perceptual attention to a person 




of engagement are attentive modes of engagement fails to do justice to Evans’s idea that 
when we understand such terms, our connection to the referents of the terms is intimate, 
direct, or en raport.  This is why we must say that according to Evans, attention is required 
to understand Russellian singular terms– perceptual attention for perceptual 
demonstratives, intellectual attention for memory demonstratives 
 Now we can consider the connection between attention and the idea of an 
“information-invoking” singular term. Consider the following passage, in which Evans says 
that when a speaker uses an information-invoking term, the speaker has the intention to 
get her audience to attend to a particular object:  
… the notion of the intended referent is rather like the notion of a 
target. Suppose the subject, in the case we have been considering, 
had aimed a gun at the man he could see. Even if his general plan was 
to shoot b—for example, because the offence he wished to avenge 
occurred in the previous encounter— it is undeniable that a was his 
target, and that he intended to shoot a. His lowest-level action plan 
concerned a; success in it would involve the shooting of a. Similarly, a 
is the speaker's linguistic target when he utters the sentence 'That 
man over there is F'; this time he is directing, not a gun, but his 
audience's attention. (Evans 1982 p. 317, emphasis mine) 
This passage lends weight to the idea that we should interpret Evans, in his descriptions of 
cases of audiences that have successfully understood information-invoking terms (e.g., the 
audience making out the right person in perception or the audience thinking of the right 
bird) as making claims that implicate attention rather than inattentive perception or 
inattentive memory. Less obviously but more importantly, this passage lends further 
weight to the idea that we should understand Evans’s account of attention as one that is 
close to something like James’s, according to which attention phenomenologically singles 




As the passage above makes clear, Evans thinks that a speaker using an information 
invoking term tries to achieve her communicative goals through directing the attention of 
her interlocutors. So the state of attending to the intended referent must be, in Evans’s 
view, a state which puts an audience in a position to realize what the intended referent 
was. On the hypothesis that Evans endorsed something like James’s view of attention, we 
have an explanation of why this makes sense. Attention phenomenologically singles out an 
object from all the others, on this way of thinking, which is why attending to an object puts 
an audience in a position to identify the intended referent. If we do not attribute to Evans 
the Jamesean view of attention, then Evans’s use of the word “attention” in the passage 
above would be either mysterious (because attention would be performing some unknown 
theoretical role) or superfluous (because if attention had no theoretical role to platy, there 
would be no reason to mention it).  
 So the main argument of this paper has concluded. While Evans did not explicitly 
state that intellectual attention is required to understand a memory-demonstrative, he did 
state that memory-demonstratives are information invoking Russellian singular terms. 
When we comprehend a Russellian singular term; we are in an en raport relation with an 
object, a relation best characterized as attentive rather than inattentive. When we hear an 
information-invoking singular term, the speaker wants us to have an attentive experience 
with phenomenologically singles out the referent of the term, and having such an attentive 
experience puts us in a position to understand what the speaker has said. So Evans’s belief 
that memory demonstratives are information invoking Russellian singular terms commits 
him, in two different ways, to the idea that intellectual attention is required to comprehend 





5. Other Interpreters of Evans   
 
My account of Evans puts us in a position to move two separate conversations in the 
literature forward: one between Peacocke and McDowell about whether Evans thought 
that imagery plays a role in comprehending memory demonstratives, and another one 
involving Hoerl and McCormack about the relationship between attention and the use of 
information in the framework that Evans developed. I’ll discuss these points in turn.  
5.1 Peacocke and McDowell 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 of his Sense and Content, Peacocke compared his view of 
understanding demonstratives to Evans’ view of understanding demonstratives, and 
argued that his own account was superior in several respects (McDowell 1990 p. 255). In 
Peacocke’s comparison of their views on understanding memory demonstratives, Peacocke 
mostly used the term “memory-image demonstrative” rather than “memory-
demonstrative” (see e.g. Peacocke 1984 p. 126, p. 173). According to a review by John 
McDowell, Peacocke’s terminology might reveal a flawed understanding of memory-
demonstratives, which overemphasizes the role that imagery plays in their comprehension, 
and perhaps moreover even reveals that Peacocke mistakenly attributes the same flawed 
understanding to Evans. McDowell thinks that because  Evans preferred to use the term 
“memory-demonstrative”, leaving out references to “images”, we should not assume that 
imagery did any work in Evans’s account (McDowell 1990 p. 260, p. 264).  
I agree with McDowell’s core critical point – experiencing a particular memorial 
image of an absent object doesn’t seem either necessary or sufficient for understanding a 




fleshing out. If it’s true that the understanding a memory-demonstrative does not require 
experiencing a mental image of the referent of the term, then what is it actually like to 
understand a memory-demonstrative? What is phenomenologically distinctive about this 
kind of experience? This is a question that McDowell leaves unanswered in his criticism of 
Peacocke, and a question that my reading of Evans is able to answer. 
Before going on to explain how I can answer this question, I should note that as a 
referee for this journal points out, this objection may be uncharitable to Peacocke. He does 
not define “memory-image” in Sense and Content, and he does not clarify his understanding 
of memory-image in his 1991 reply to McDowell published in Mind. It’s possible that by 
“memory-image”, Peacocke just meant “memory experience”, which could encompass more 
kinds of experiences than memory images. And if this is all that Peacocke meant, then 
McDowell’s criticism of him would not apply. However, if this is all that Peacocke meant, 
then Peacocke’s account still leaves unanswered the same question that McDowell’s 
account leaves unanswered: namely, what is it actually like to comprehend a memory 
demonstrative? Can we say something more substantive than just the claim that a subject 
must have a certain kind of experience that seems like a memory? According to my reading 
of Evans, we can.  
 
As I’ve argued above, what Evans actually thinks is that understanding a memory-
demonstrative seems to requires attending to the referent of the term, and thereby having 
an experience that is in some sense analogous to the experience of “making out” the right 
person in perception while comprehending a perceptual demonstrative referring to the 




objection all seem possible. During such an experience, the remembered object would 
become singled out from all the other objects in the thinker’s experience. So understanding 
Evans’s position as I do allows us to provide a phenomenologically detailed answer to the 
question that McDowell’s account, as well as the more charitable version of Peacocke’s 
account, both left unanswered.  
5.2 Hoerl and McCormack 
 I will move on to consider another mistaken interpretation of Evans’s account of 
memory-demonstratives, according to which he does not actually think that any kind of 
attention is required to understand them. In their paper “Joint Reminiscing as Joint 
Attention to the Past”, Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack first argue that “episodic 
recall uniquely involves the particular form of attention, which might be described as 
attention to particular past events” (Hoerl and McCormack pp. 263-265). Then they go on 
to argue that there is a sense in which people can jointly attend to past events together, just 
like they can jointly perceptually attend together to nearby objects in the environment 
(Hoerl and McCormack pp. 263-265 p. 283). They think that when we talk about past 
events with each other, we employ such a capacity. 
 While they pursue their first goal, they compare the way that they think that thought 
and talk about past events functions to the way that Evans thinks that thought and talk 
about past events functions. On Hoerl and McCormack’s view, Evans doesn’t think that 
intellectual attention is required for episodic recall, and moreover, they argue, this alleged 
feature of his view is a problem for him. This is how they characterize Evans’s view:  
Consider the following example, adapted from Alfred Ayer (1956) 
and Gareth Evans (1982; see also Campbell, 2001). Suppose that a 
friend tries to remind you of an incident in your past of which she 




incident does come back to you. This may happen quite suddenly, ‘in 
a flash of recollection’, as Evans (1982 p. 308 puts it). The question 
now is: How should we describe what happened to you—i.e. what 
this change in your state amounts to?  
 
Evans thinks that the change at issue can be described as a change in 
the causal history of your state. As he puts it, the relevant state of 
recollection only sets in once ‘the right information is retrieved’ 
(ibid)—i.e. information that traces back to your own experience of 
the incident. … [but as] the literature on priming brings out, there are 
a number of ways in which particular past experiences can have a 
causal influence on a person’s subsequent mental state in the 
absence of conscious recollection (c.f. e.g. Mayes, 2001, for 
examples). Thus, it is not clear why we should rule out the possibility 
that your friend’s attempts to jog your memory succeeded in 
activating information retained from your experience of the incident, 
even before the flash of recollection occurred. Indeed, such 
information might play a part in explaining your ability to form an 
accurate mental image say, of the location and people involved. 
(Hoerl and McCormack p. 264). 
 
On Hoerl and McCormack’s way of interpreting Evans, whether an audience trying to 
understand a memory demonstrative has retrieved the right information depends entirely 
on the causal connection between the audience’s current informational state and the past 
event. Hoerl and McCormack seem right to say that such an account of understanding 
memory-demonstratives seems inadequate.  
As they say, even when a causal link is present, and information from a past event is 
having an effect on the subject’s present state, the audience might not have the 
characteristic experience of understanding the memory-demonstrative.  The audience 
might instead have an experience that is causally influenced by the previously perceived 
object, but in a subliminal way, and in a way that does not facilitate comprehension of the 
memory demonstrative. Hoerl and McCormack go on to argue that a subject’s making the 




information,  is sufficient for attention, and that such a way of attending is required to 
understand the reference to the past event (Hoerl and McCormack pp. 263-265 p. 283).10  
But Hoerl and McCormack seem to have misunderstood Evans’s account. They say 
that according to Evans, after the flash of recollection, the only thing that has changed 
about the subject is the causal history of her informational state. However, consider what 
Evans writes immediately before his description of this case involving recollection: 
“Understanding the kind of use of a referring expression I am referring is to not a matter of 
having beliefs with the right sort of content, but having, and using, information from the 
right source” (Evans 1982 p. 307, emphasis mine). 
Hoerl and McCormack’s criticism would be correct if Evans had not said “and using” 
in the preceding sentence. But Evans’s phrase “… and using …” – which shows up 
throughout the text in his characterizations of information-invoking expressions – reveals 
that he thinks that experiencing the flash of recollection requires not just the audience’s 
being causally influenced by the right bird, but also the audience’s using that information to 
interpret the speaker’s remark.  
Evans describes explicitly what this process of using the right information is, as 
applied to a perceptual case, earlier in the same chapter: “… if a speaker utters ‘This man is 
F’, making a demonstrative reference … the hearer can understand the remark only if he 
perceives the man concerned, and, bringing his perceptual information to bear on the 
interpretation of the remark, judges ‘This man is F: that’s what the speaker is saying”. 
 
10 A further question to ask and address is whether the cognitive representations we employ in understanding 
memory-demonstratives merely enable understanding, or themselves contribute to the epistemic standing of 
our states of linguistic understanding (see, e.g. Burge 1993 p. 481 for a discussion of whether perception 
enables or justifies the knowledge we acquire through testimony). I don’t take up the issue here, but am inclined 
to argue that, in general, our uses of information from both cognitive and perceptual representations contribute 




(Evans 1982 p. 305) So in the recollection case, Evans would say that the audience needs to 
have information from the bird in order to interpret the remark, but that having this 
information is insufficient for comprehending the memory demonstrative referring to the 
bird. The audience would also need to bring their information to bear on their 
interpretation in just the same way. So it is a mistake to say that according to Evans, mere 
priming could cause the audience to be in an informational state counts as understanding 
the memory-demonstrative. In cases of mere priming, a subject is not actively using the 
information and bringing it to bear on how she is interpreting a speaker’s remark.   
Hoerl and McCormark go on to argue that in order to understand memory-
demonstratives, we need to use our attention rather than by merely causally influenced by 
the right information, and they construe attention in terms of a subject’s using information 
to answer questions about her past environment. (Hoerl and McCormack p. 266) As we’re 
now in a position to appreciate, at this level of abstraction their account is effectively 
identical to Evans’s own account, in that Hoerl & McCormack and Evans all believe that 
using the right information is an important part of comprehending a memory 
demonstrative. Moreover, if the main argument of this paper is successful, then for Evans 
this particular use of information is a kind of use of information that deserves to be called 
“attention”, which brings the accounts of Hoerl & McCormack and Evans even closer 
together.  
While Hoerl & McCormack endorse the same kind of view Evans does, according to 
which using the right information is required to comprehending a memory demonstrative, 
it’s worth noting that there is still much that is novel and worthwhile about their 




demonstratives in relation to the idea that agents can play an active role in processes like 
looking and remembering, with reference to work by Ulric Neisser, Naomi Eilan, and 
Johannes Roessler (Hoerl and McCormack p. 265). Evans, by contrast, does not do as much 
work to situate his account of using the right information in relation to a broader view 
about agency and mental processes.  
6. Conclusion  
As I noted above, distinguishing between perceptual and intellectual attention puts 
us in a position to ask a variety of interesting questions about intellectual attention and 
linguistic understanding. I’ve made some headway on addressing one of the simpler 
questions that such a distinction enables us to ask: is intellectual attention ever required to 
understand a memory demonstrative? I argued that Evans is at least one philosopher who 
would give a “yes” answer to that question. I argued that the best way to interpret his 
remarks about the phenomenology of understanding memory-demonstratives was in 
terms of the effects of conscious intellectual attention. On my view, Evans thinks that when 
we understand a memory-demonstrative we have an attentive experience which 
phenomenologically singles out the referent of the memory-demonstrative from all the 
other objects.  
There are further questions to be asked about the epistemic role intellectual 
attention plays in communication, and in our mental lives more broadly. When it comes to 
future investigations into communication, as I noted in the introduction, we might extend 
my discussion in this paper to ask whether linguistic understanding ever requires joint 




plays a role in the best account of linguistic understanding. When it comes to future 
investigations into our mental lives, we might ask what sorts of tasks are possible with and 
without intellectual attention, and whether it plays a role in inference. Through my work 
here – providing a case studying of intellectual attention playing a particular functional role 
– I’ve helped set the foundation for future studies like these.  
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